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The decoy-state method allows the use of weak coherent pulses in quantum cryptography, and to date, various
strategies for the decoy state have been proposed. Here, we experimentally compare the secret key generation
rates between the one-decoy and two-decoy implementations of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key
distribution protocol through a 3.1-km optical fiber at 780 nm. Once the parameters of the experimental setup
are optimized for the maximal secret key generation rate for each implementation, it is found that the two-decoy
implementation outperforms the one-decoy implementation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two communicat-
ing parties, Alice (transmitter) and Bob (receiver), to possess
a secret string of random bits (0s and 1s) or cryptographic
keys that are secure from an eavesdropper, Eve. To offer
unconditional security, a single-photon source is an essential
element for building a secure quantum cryptography system
[1,2]. Since a high-efficiency single-photon source optimized
for quantum cryptography is not yet available, QKD is often
implemented with weak coherent pulses (WCPs) such that
the average photon number per pulse μ = n¯ < 1. Attenuated
laser pulses or WCPs, however, follow the Poissonian photon
statistics closely, so there is a nonzero probability of having two
or more photons. An eavesdropper, Eve, could then implement
the photon number splitting (PNS) attack on the quantum
channel to extract some of the shared key bits without being
detected [3–5].
To deal with the potential PNS attack, the Scarani-Acin-
Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol [6] and the decoy-
state method [7] have been proposed. SARG04 differs from
the BB84 protocol [8] only in the classical sifting procedure.
Although SARG04 can counter the PNS attack without extra
efforts and cost, it has a lower secret-key generation rate than
that of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol in the real
world under the most general attack [9–11]. The decoy-state
method, first proposed by Hwang [7] and further developed
by others [12,13], counters the PNS attack differently. The
basic idea of the decoy-state method is that Alice prepares
and sends WCPs with several different μ, which consist
of the signal and decoy states, to Bob. Due to the lack of
knowledge of which WCP is the signal and which is the decoy,
Eve is forced to carry out the PNS attack on all WCPs. As
the signal and the decoy states have different μ, Eve’s PNS
attack will cause the signal and the decoy yields at Bob to
differ [7,12,13]. This difference can then be used to test the
presence of the PNS attack on the quantum channel. The
decoy-state method is usually implemented using the BB84
protocol [8] and more than one-decoy states may be used
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[12,13]. Although the decoy-state method itself is not a QKD
protocol, the one-decoy (two-decoy) state method is usually
called one-decoy (two-decoy) state protocol [14].
The decoy-state method so far has been implemented for
the free-space quantum channel [15,16] and for the fiber-optic
quantum channel [17–19] for specific average photon numbers
per pulse for the signal (μ) and the decoy (ν) states. Although
the optimal values of μ and ν can be calculated [20,21], there
has not been an experimental study which investigated whether
the theoretical optimum conditions match well with those of
the experimental ones. To be more specific, there has not been
an experimental study to compare the performance of one-
decoy and two-decoy-state protocols in a given experimental
setting.
In this work, we report an experimental comparison
between one-decoy and two-decoy implementations of the
BB84 quantum cryptography protocol. By using a 3.1 km
optical fiber spool as the quantum channel and using 780 nm
WCP, we have investigated the optimal conditions (i.e.,
maximum secure key generation rates) for the one-decoy
and the two-decoy implementations of the BB84 protocols.
Our experimental results show clearly that, given the same
experimental conditions, the two-decoy (i.e., vacuum and
WCP) state protocol outperforms the one-decoy (i.e., WCP
only) state protocol.
II. SECRET KEY GENERATION RATE
Alice and Bob can generate the secret key from the
sifted key by classical postprocessing that consists of error
correction and privacy amplification [22,23]. The sifted keys
contain errors, so Alice and Bob reconcile the sifted key via
the error correction process. Some of the widely used error
correction methods in QKD experiments are the cascaded
method, winnow, and the low-density parity check (LDPC)
[24–27]. Choosing a proper error correction code is important
since each code requires different computing power and has a
different efficiency. In theory, however, once the efficiency of
the error correction is given, one can estimate the maximum
secret key generation rate regardless of the actual QKD
implementation. In the following, we set the error correction
efficiency f (x) = 1 as widely assumed [14,21]. After the
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error correction process, Alice and Bob possess identical
keys, but the key may not be completely private. The privacy
amplification process is then applied to extract secure keys.
The secret key generation rate after the classical postpro-
cessing can be determined by the overall gain Gμ and the
overall quantum bit error rate (QBER) Qμ. The overall gain
Gμ denotes the probability that Bob can obtain a detection
event when Alice sends a WCP with average photon number
μ. For a QKD system based on WCP, the overall gain can
be represented as Gμ =
∑∞
i=0 Gi =
∑∞
i=0 Yi
μi
i! e
−μ
, where
Gi and Yi denote the gain and the yield of the i-photon
state. The μ
i
i! e
−μ factor represents the Poissonian photon
number distribution of the WCP. The QBER Qμ represents
the probability that Bob will receive an incorrect bit value
when Alice sends a bit value encoded in WCP with μ [14,21].
The secret key generation rate per pulse sent by Alice is then
given as
r  rL = −qGμH2(Qμ) + qGL1 − qGL1 H2
(
QU1
)
, (1)
where q is the basis reconciliation factor (1/2 for the BB84
protocol), H2(x) is the binary Shannon entropy, and GL1 =
Y1e
−μμ and QU1 are the lower bound of the gain and the upper
bound of QBER for the single-photon state, respectively. The
first and third terms in Eq. (1) represent the error correction
and the privacy amplification processes, respectively. Note that
Eq. (1) includes the lower and upper bounds for the single-
photon gain and QBER rather than the exact values. Therefore,
GL1 and QU1 need to be accurately estimated in an experiment
to achieve the maximum secret key generation rate.
A. Two-decoy-state method
The BB84 protocol applied with the decoy-state method
yields a larger number of secret keys than the BB84 protocol
without the decoy. This is due to the fact that the BB84 with
decoy allows us to more accurately estimate the values of GL1
and QU1 than the BB84 without decoy. In the two-decoy-state
method, two decoy states with average photon numbers ν1 and
ν2 are transmitted. Usually, one of the decoy states is set to the
vacuum state, ν1 = 0, and the other is usually weaker than the
signal state, ν2 = ν < μ.
For the two-decoy scheme, the lower bound GL1 of the signal
photon gain and the upper bound QU1 of the single-photon
QBER are given by [14,17]
G1  GL1 =
μ2e−μ
μν − ν2
(
GLν e
ν − Gμeμ ν
2
μ2
− YU0
μ2 − ν2
μ2
)
,
(2)
Q1  QU1 =
GμQμ − e0Y0e−μ
GL1
, (3)
respectively. Here, GLν is the lower bound of the decoy gain
GLν = Gν(1 − 10√NνGν ), whereNν is the number of decoy pulses
sent by Alice. YU0 and e0 = 0.5 denote the upper bounds of the
dark count probability and the error probability due to a dark
count, respectively. Note that YU0 can be obtained directly from
the vacuum decoy state. From Eqs. (1)–(3), we can calculate
the lower bound of the secret key generation rate for the two-
decoy-state method with BB84.
B. One-decoy-state method
The one-decoy-state method does not use the vacuum state,
relying only on a single decoy state with photon number
ν. Since the vacuum state is not used, the upper bound
YU0 of the dark counts probability cannot be obtained from
the experimental data but must be estimated as Y0  YU0 =
GμQμ exp(μ)
e0
. Applying the estimated YU0 to Eqs. (2) and (3),
one can get the lower bound GL1 of the single-photon gain and
the upper bound eU1 of the single-photon QBER [14].
III. EXPERIMENT
Before we describe our experimental setup, it would be
beneficial to briefly introduce the BB84 QKD protocol [8]. In
the original BB84 protocol, Alice sends a single-photon pulse
encoded randomly in one of the four polarization states that
form two nonorthogonal bases to Bob. The polarization bases
widely used in BB84 are the Z basis {|H 〉,|V 〉} and the X basis
{|45◦〉,| − 45◦〉}. Here, |H 〉 and |V 〉 denote horizontal and ver-
tical polarizations, respectively, and |45◦〉 = 1√
2
(|H 〉 + |V 〉)
and | − 45◦〉 = 1√
2
(|H 〉 − |V 〉). Bob then randomly selects
the measurement basis and records the detection events.
Later, Alice and Bob compare their bases via a classical
communication channel and generate sifted keys only when
their bases are the same. Secret keys can then be generated by
classical postprocessing.
In our QKD system to implement one-decoy- and two-
decoy-state protocols (Fig. 1), Alice’s setup consists of two
diode lasers (780 nm; one for the signal and the other for
the decoy), a variable attenuator, two Pockels cells, a fiber
polarization controller (FPC), and a field-programmable gate
array (FPGA) controller. The signal and decoy laser pulses
are combined by a single-mode fiber to clean up the spatial
mode (not shown in Fig. 1). The average photon numbers of the
signal and decoy can be changed by using a variable attenuator
and a neutral density (ND) filter.
Alice first generates three random bit sequences: one for
selecting the encoding basis, another for the raw key, and the
third for choosing to launch the signal or decoy. The signal and
decoy pulses are randomly encoded to one of four polarization
Alice’s PC
(FPGA)
Laser Pockels cells
Bob’s PC
(C+T)
IF
ND
Single mode fiber
Quantum channel
FPC
Public channel
Classical sync channel (TTL)
TCP/IP for key sifting
Z basis
X basis
s
d
FIG. 1. Schematic of experimental setup. Alice: The signal laser
(s) pulses and the decoy laser (d) pulses are strongly attenuated
and polarization encoded with two Pockels cells (PC1, PC2). The
signal laser, decoy laser, and Pockels cells are controlled by a
field-programmable gate array module (FPGA). Bob: Bob’s detection
events are recorded using a PC-based counter and timer (C + T).
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states (|V 〉,|H 〉,|45◦〉,| − 45◦〉) by two Pockels cells. They
are split into two paths; one is connected to a single-photon
detector that checks the average photon number; the other is
linked to Bob through the quantum channel, which is a 3.1-
km-long single-mode fiber spool. The attenuation coefficient
of the fiber at 780 nm is α = 3 dB/km.
Bob receives the signal and decoy pulses through a 3-nm
interference filter (IF) in order to reduce the background noise.
The measurement basis is randomly chosen by the beam
splitter in the X basis (|45◦〉,| − 45◦〉) or the Z basis (|V 〉,|H 〉)
by polarization analyzers and four single-photon detectors. To
reduce background noise, the single-photon detectors are gated
on at the expected arrival time of the incoming photon within
100-ns time windows. The detection efficiency is ηBob ≈ 0.4,
and the detector dark count probability pd = (3.3 ± 0.6) ×
10−5. The detection events are stored at Bob’s computer in two
counter and timer (C + T) peripheral component interconnect
(PCI) boards.
The one- and two- (vacuum + weak) decoy-state methods
with the BB84 protocol were implemented in the same QKD
system under a fixed quantum channel. We experimentally
investigated the lower bound of the secret key generation rate
in one- and two-decoy-state methods under the most general
eavesdropping attack. The numbers of raw keys were 109
Mbits in the one-decoy-state method for 109 s and 99 Mbits
in the two-decoy-state method for 99 s.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Before the experiment, the numerical calculation was
performed to determine the theoretical optimal conditions to
maximize the number of secret keys using Eq. (1). For the
one-decoy-state method, the optimal average photon numbers
of the signal and decoy were calculated to be μ ≈ 0.21 and
ν ≈ 0.14, respectively; the optimal signal-to-decoy-state ratio
was found to be Nμ
Ntotal
: Nν
Ntotal
= 0.708 : 0.292, where Ntotal, Nμ,
and Nν are the total numbers of raw, signal, and decoy bits sent
by Alice. Note that the optimal value of the average photon
numbers in our simulation is very different from the previous
value (μ ≈ 0.8 and ν ≈ 0.12 in Ref. [17]) due to the large
differences in the simulation parameters (Table I).
A. The signal-to-decoy ratio in the one-decoy-state method
First, we experimentally investigated the optimal signal
ratio at the fixed average photon numbers of the signal (μ ≈
TABLE I. The key parameters for the optimal condition esti-
mation are the detection error probability edet, the dark count rate
of the detector Y0, the transmittance in Bob’s side ηBob, and the
loss in the quantum channel (10−αl/10), where l is the length of the
quantum channel and α is an attenuation coefficient. The detection
error probability characterizes the stability and the alignment of the
optical system and is usually independent of the length of the quantum
channel. λ is the operating wavelength.
λ (nm) α (dB/km) edet(%) ηBob Y0
Ref. [17] 1550 0.21 0.8269 0.0227 2.11 × 10−5
This work 780 3 3.7 0.4 1.32 × 10−4
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FIG. 2. (a) The sifted key rate and (b) the secret key rate for
various signal ratios on BB84 with the one-decoy-state method.
Experiments are done for μ ≈ 0.211 and ν ≈ 0.135.
0.211) and of the decoy (ν ≈ 0.139) in the one-decoy-state
protocol [Fig. 2(a)]. Because the signal has a larger average
photon number than the decoy, the total sifted key rate slightly
increases as the ratio of the signal increases. The QBERs
were 4.2% ± 0.1% for the signal and 4.7% ± 0.2% for the
decoy. The secret key rates [Fig. 2(b)] were estimated from
the experimentally obtained QBER and the sifted key rate of
the signal and decoy using Eq. (1). Although the sifted key
rate increased as the signal ratio increased when μ > ν, the
secret key rate cannot be increased with increasing signal ratio
because we cannot obtain the tight bound of GL1 as the sifted
key rate of the decoy decreases. Hence, an optimal signal ratio
which maximizes the secret key rate exists at a fixed average
photon number of the signal and decoy. The secret key rate
was highest when the signal ratio was 0.752 and was similar
to the theoretical optimal signal ratio of 0.708.
We implemented the one-decoy-state protocol for several
average photon numbers of the decoy. Although each result
used the same average photon number (μ ≈ 0.301) for the
signal, it had a different sifted key rate due to different optimal
signal ratios [Fig. 3(a)]. The QBER of the decoy decreased
from 5.6% to 4.0% as the average photon number of the
decoy increased but did not change much if the dark count
contributions were subtracted. Secret keys cannot be generated
if the average photon number of the decoy is the same as that
of the signal; this condition corresponds to the original BB84
protocol [11,28]. The secret key rate was highest at ν ≈ 0.248;
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FIG. 3. (a) Key rates vs average photon number of the decoy for
the one-decoy scheme. Each result uses the optimal signal ratio for a
fixed average photon number of the signal (μ ≈ 0.301) and various
average photon numbers of the decoy (ν ≈ 0.102, 0.153, 0.201, 0.248,
and 0.260). The QBERs of the signal were ∼ 4.1%. (b) Key rates for
the various average photon numbers of the signal and decoy in the
one-decoy scheme.
therefore the decoy average photon number has an optimal
value when the average photon number of the signal is fixed
at μ ≈ 0.301.
We repeated the sifted (secret) key rate vs decoy average
photon number measurement for various values of the signal
average photon number [Fig. 3(b)]; the total sifted key rate
increased as the average photon number of the signal and the
decoy increased; then the ratio of the decoy in the total sifted
keys increased to generate many secret keys when the average
photon number of the decoy was large. The QBER of the signal
decreased from 4.6% to 3.7% as the average photon number
of the signal increased, and the QBER of the decoy decreased
from 5.9% to 3.9% as the average photon number of the decoy
increased. However, the QBERs did not change much if the
detector dark count contributions were subtracted; this result is
similar to that obtained in a previous BB84 experiment [11,28].
The one-decoy-state method with BB84 has a maximum secret
key rate of 334 bits/s at the optimal average photon number of
the signal (μ ≈ 0.243) and the decoy (ν ≈ 0.145) in the 3.1-
km quantum channel; these values are similar to the theoretical
results (μ ≈ 0.21 and ν ≈ 0.14).
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FIG. 4. (a) Key rate vs weak decoy ratio when the signal ratio
was fixed 0.752 and (b) key rate vs ratio of signal and weak decoy at
two (vacuum + weak) decoys. Experiments are done for μ ≈ 0.416,
ν ≈ 0.010, and vacuum. The sifted key rate of the decoy is very small
because the decoy has a smaller average photon number than does
the signal.
B. Two-decoy-state method
We also implemented the two- (vacuum + weak) decoy-
state method with the BB84 protocol for a fixed average photon
number of the signal (μ ≈ 0.416) and the decoy (ν ≈ 0.010).
Theoretically, the fixed average photon number of the signal
and the decoy is not an optimal value to maximize the number
of the secret key in the two-decoy scheme. First, the two-decoy-
state method with BB84 was implemented at the variation of
the weak decoy ratio under a fixed signal ratio ( Nμ
Ntotal
≈ 0.752);
then the sum of the ratio of the vacuum and the weak decoy
state was fixed at Nν+Nvacuum
Ntotal
≈ 0.248. The total sifted key rate
in the experimental results [Fig. 4(a)] was almost constant
because the signal average photon number was larger than the
decoy (i.e., μ  ν). QBERs of the signal and decoy were 3.6%
and 10.5%, respectively. The decoy state has a higher QBER
than the signal state because the average photon number of
the decoy is small. But QBERs of the signal and the decoy
were almost the same when the dark count contribution was
subtracted. As shown in Fig. 4(a), the secret key rate estimated
from the sifted key rate and QBER was highest at Nν
Ntotal
≈
0.149; that is, the weak decoy ratio has an optimal value under
the fixed average photon number and signal ratio.
We implemented the two-decoy-state protocol for various
values of the signal ratio [Fig. 4(b)] in μ ≈ 0.416 and ν ≈
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TABLE II. Comparison of experimental results for one and two
decoys. The secret key rate, R = Ntotalr , is estimated from the number
of signal and decoy pulses (Nμ,Nν) sent by Alice, Gμ,Gν,Eμ, and
Eν , where Gx and Ex are the overall gain and the overall QBER,
x = μ,ν. Note that r is the secret key rate per pulse sent by Alice,
and Ntotal is the number of total pulses sent by Alice.
One decoy Two decoys
Ntotal 1.09 × 108 9.9 × 107
Gμ 1.14 × 10−2 1.95 × 10−2
Gν 6.91 × 10−3 4.81 × 10−4
Eμ 4.04 × 10−2 3.76 × 10−2
Eν 4.37 × 10−2 1.17 × 10−1
R (bits/s) 3.34 × 102 7.56 × 102
0.010. In the result, the total sifted key rate increased according
to increasing signal ratio, but QBERs of the signal and the
decoy were almost constant at 3.8% and 11.4%, respectively.
Then the measured dark count rate in the vacuum state was
about Y0 = 6.8 × 10−5. We estimated the secret key rate from
the sifted key rate, QBER, and average photon number. The
maximum secret key rate of 756 bits/s was generated at Nμ
Ntotal
≈
0.752 and Nν
Ntotal
≈ 0.149.
Finally, we compare the experimental results of one- and
two-decoy-state methods in Table II. With the one-decoy-state
method, we could generate a secret key rate of 334 bits/s, while
we achieved 756 bits/s with the two-decoy-state method. The
results clearly show that the two-decoy method outperforms
the one-decoy method for the same experimental conditions.
V. CONCLUSION
We have successfully performed an experimental imple-
mentation of one-decoy- and two-decoy-state (vacuum +
weak) protocols via a 3.1-km quantum channel. We have
checked the optimal value for the average photon number and
signal-to-decoy ratio in the one-decoy-state protocol with both
theory and experiment. We have also shown the optimal ratio of
the signal and the decoy in the two-decoy protocol. With these
results, we have experimentally shown that the two-decoy-state
method can generate a larger number of secret keys than the
one-decoy-state method at the same length of the quantum
channel.
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